The War on Truth Against Israel (Part 2)
Understanding the complexities and dangers of fighting in an urban environment
Much of the world has uncritically accepted the findings of a recent United Nations commission of inquiry report claiming that Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. A much less publicised report, ‘Debunking the Genocide Allegations: A Re-examination of the Israel-Hamas War from October 7, 2023 to June 1, 2025’, paints a somewhat differing picture.
Compiled by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Prophecy Today considered it appropriate to provide a summary of the main contents of this in-depth and academic study. Part One ably debunked the ‘Mass Starvation’ allegations. The present article focuses on the complexities and dangers of fighting in an urban environment. High rise buildings, in particular, massively increase the area that needs to be taken, and Hamas’ use of extensive tunnels is well documented.
Deterrents
The report makes clear that many modern weapons are useless in this sort of environment. An attacking force in general is estimated to need six times the number of combatants than the defending enemy, which can attack from any direction – not just from around, but from above and below. The defender knows the terrain much better than any invader, and has a substantial advantage from this. Urban combat is particularly difficult when there are still uninvolved civilians, particularly as making split-second distinctions between combatants and non-combatants is very difficult, and the fact that residential and public buildings can also serve as defensive positions. All this is enough to deter many armies from advancing.
Comparisons: Philippines, Chechnya and Bosnia
When civilians can be evacuated, it greatly decreases the loss of life. The report highlights various recent battles, including Marawi in the Philippines, where, in 2017, a battle took place between Philippine government forces and the ‘Islamic State of the Philippines’ (an ISIS affiliate). Almost all the 200,000 civilians escaped or evacuated with government help – though ISIS killed Christians attempting to flee.
When civilians can be evacuated, it greatly decreases the loss of life.
Yet even then, virtually all buildings in the combat zones were damaged or destroyed, and more than half of the residents became refugees, unable to return. In the Chechnya war, most of Grozny’s civilians evacuated, but possibly up to a quarter of those who remained were killed, as neither Russian and Chechen forces made any effort to limit civilian casualties. In fact, with the exception of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ethnic cleansing was one of the goals, both attacking militaries and defenders alike have normally endeavoured to evacuate cities before or soon after battle has commenced.
However, in more recent times, defenders have more often tried to adopt different methods, deliberately keeping civilians in place, with fighters blending into the population by not always wearing uniform. “Ironically” the report states, “it may well be that Western sensibilities to civilian casualties not only incentivize civilian shielding and camouflage practices but result in worse outcomes for civilians.”
Taliban and ISIS
The Taliban is highlighted as one such group to do this, using civilians as human shields and preventing their escape, sometimes resulting in significant casualties from coalition forces. In Iraq, ISIS members also mined escape routes and shot or punished those trying to flee. In these cases, this is seen to help the cause: anger against the attackers is a useful recruiting tool, and makes the civilians less likely to welcome the invaders. Additionally, and in particular, it provides pressure from public opinion, both locally and globally. The report notes that this is the guiding principle of Hamas’s defensive strategy. (Interestingly, though not stated in the report, all the examples given of this behaviour were carried out by Islamist entities.)
Anger against the attackers is a useful recruiting tool, and makes the civilians less likely to welcome the invaders.
Human shield strategy
Previously captured Hamas documents clearly show that Hamas’ strategy has long been based on the fact that IDF soldiers must “limit their use of weapons and tactics that lead to unnecessary damage and loss of civilian life and property”. Therefore, they have deliberately developed their c, in order to complicate any efforts by the Israelis, thus “increasing hatred toward the attackers” and “boosting support for city defenders”. Yahya Sinwar said that civilian casualties are not only “an inevitable sacrifice” but also “will pump blood into the veins of the nation” and strengthen Hamas.
Hamas specifically instructed civilians not to obey IDF evacuation warnings. It has, nonetheless, been hard for civilians to evacuate completely, as no areas have been completely safe. Whereas the IDF designated certain areas as Humanitarian zones, Hamas refused to declare anywhere as an area where its fighters would not operate, using one Humanitarian Zone, for example, as a launching site for rockets. Residents could not flee Gaza entirely, as Egypt closed the southern border – and countries around the world, Arab neighbours included, refused to provide refuge for Palestinians.
Tunnels and hospitals
The report clearly tells of the well-known Hamas tunnels, which enables Hamas fighters to remain safely beneath the built-up area, with shafts frequently hidden in both hospitals and homes, including even children’s bedrooms. Weapons were also concealed in civilian infrastructure: homes, hospitals, schools, mosques and UNRWA facilities. After the second raid on Shifa Hospital, “a Palestinian eyewitness testified that before the operation, hundreds of Hamas members, some armed, were inside the hospital, and that during the operation, several mid-level and senior Hamas commanders and members of Islamic Jihad were also detained inside the hospital walls.” Previously, a tunnel route had been uncovered between the hospital and Hamas command centres.
The challenges facing Israeli troops is clearly expressed: “Hamas fighters used tunnels, sometimes from civilian homes, as launch points for attacks and safe havens. Some emerged from tunnels unarmed and disguised as civilians, picked up weapons from civilian weapon caches, and launched attacks.” “The enemy’s threat was three-dimensional— underground, at high elevations, and at ground level— and the number of tunnels and shafts meant that even if Israeli forces were present in a specific area, they had to assume the enemy could appear at any moment from any surrounding building not yet mapped for tunnels.”
Despite all the challenges, the IDF, as much as possible, warns the population before attacking an area – this despite losing the crucial element of surprise.
Booby traps were prolific, according to the IDF; even children’s school bags and dolls have been at times used to hide explosives. This is one of the main reasons for the widespread destruction of Gaza’s buildings by the Israeli forces. That said, the report comments that there have been cases of unjustified destruction, or buildings that have been destroyed without proper approval.
Understanding the actual realities
Despite all the challenges, the IDF, as much as possible, warns the population before attacking an area – this despite losing the crucial element of surprise. No other military uses such a specific and targeted warning system – indeed, US military officials have expressed concern over this precedent, which could undermine the effectiveness of other armies, if they are expected to follow suit.
“War is a competitive and reciprocal activity” states the report, “and one cannot understand the behaviour of one side or analyse the military logic behind it (let alone interpret it legally or morally) without considering the conduct of the opposing side. And yet, such one-sided judgement is characteristic of critics, researchers, UN agencies, and human rights organizations that only barely address Hamas’s fighting methods, if they do so at all.”
Essentially, this chapter argues that any moral or legal assessment of the war in Gaza must be based on an understanding of the actual realities faced by the IDF, in order to draw balanced and fair conclusions.
The report is written by the following scholars:
Prof. Danny Orbach is a military historian from the Department of History and Asian Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Dr. Jonathan Boxman is an independent scholar and an expert in quantitative analysis
Dr. Yagil Henkin is a military historian at Shalem College and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security
Adv. Jonathan Braverman is a member of the Israeli bar and IHL lawyer
Kathryn Price, 26/09/2025