The War on Truth Against Israel (Part 4)
Indiscriminate Bombing?
Israel has frequently been accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilians, even with intention to cause maximum harm. Following on from the three previous articles, this provides a summary of the fourth chapter of ‘Debunking the Genocide Allegations: A Re-examination of the Israel-Hamas War from October 7, 2023 to June 1, 2025’, compiled by the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (B-SCSS), a report little publicised by mainstream media.
Part One debunked the ‘Mass Starvation’ allegations. Part Two laid bare the complexities and dangers of fighting in an urban environment. Part Three focused refuted the claims of widespread massacre and deliberate killing. The present chapter seeks to investigate the allegations of indiscriminate bombing, and it begins by setting the issue in context – that of the legal, international framework in the Geneva Convention for warfare.
The legal context of war
The Geneva Convention states that armies should differentiate between legitimate military objectives and civilian objects (people and buildings etc.). Any attacks should be limited to military objectives – that is, they should only be undertaken when there is the intention to achieve a clear military advantage.
The defending party is obligated to take precautions to protect civilians from attack – distinguishing the military forces from the civilian population by positioning them away from civilian areas and, when required, evacuating its own civilians from military sites and anticipated zones of combat.
Any attacks should be limited to military objectives – that is, they should only be undertaken when there is the intention to achieve a clear military advantage.
However, it is accepted, legally, that civilians may require to be killed and injured in the process of achieving the stated military objective – with proportionality being a key principle. That is, any decision about an attack should consider “whether the anticipated harm to civilians disproportionately exceeds the direct and concrete military advantage.” The B-SCSS report emphasises here that there is no specified ratio of how many civilian casualties are acceptable in relation to combatants killed. Proportionality is assessed using subjective professional judgement, before any attack, which “is pragmatic and context-dependent and must consider the strategic goals of the overall operation - not just isolated incidents - as well as whether the objective can be achieved with less harm to civilians.”
Therefore ‘collateral damage’ can be, in contexts such as densely populated environments, lawful, provided all feasible precautions are taken to minimise death and injury to civilians, and that the civilian harm is not “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Targets and methods should be chosen which cause the least possible harm to civilians, whilst still having the realistic potential of success in the mission, of achieving the objective.
However, it is clearly stated in the Geneva Convention that “The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.” Thus, if civilians are present near a target, it does not mean that that target should not be attacked. Hamas, however, have frequently been using civilians as ‘human shields.’
Excessive use of air munitions?
The report’s authors focus on Lee Mordechai’s criticism of Israel’s conduct, criticism which is echoed elsewhere. The first of these criticisms is about excessive use of air munitions. Mordechai compares the approximately 29,000 air munitions used by Israel up to December 2023 with the much lower number of 3,678 air munitions used by the United States during the Iraq War from 2004-2010.
.... the IDF could have used fewer munitions to inflict greater casualties, thereby conserving its resources.
However, the report points out that not only from a legal position is this comparison flawed, since all use of munitions in war should be examined based on specific circumstances each time, but that the comparison is completely unreasonable, since the dates considered are the first three months of Israel’s campaign, compared with the later stages of the Iraq War.
These later stages began nine months after the US invasion, following the establishment of a provisional Iraqi government, backed by the exiled Iraqi opposition, then, later, a well-supported Iraqi government. These are conditions that bear little resemblance to the confined, densely populated, urban warfare of Gaza. In contrast, the US deployed 29,199 air munitions (frequently cluster bombs, not used by Israel in Gaza) in the initial stages of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, similar to Israel’s figures in the examined period.
Criticism has also been focused on high casualty rates from bombing. Statistical analysis does not reflect this. Looking at the data from October to the end of December, 2023, reports indicated approximately 22,000 Palestinian deaths, both combatants and civilians – and many of these were from ground fighting. If Mordechai’s assessment of 29,000 aerial munitions is correct, that is fewer than one casualty per aerial munition (not counting those killed in weapons fire or tank shells).
As the report concludes, “In our opinion, this indicates a pattern of widespread precision strikes aimed at neutralizing specific targets while minimizing collateral damage. At the very least, it indicates that Israel was directing its strikes mostly at areas with little civilian presence, whether in evacuated areas or in buildings that had received specific evacuation orders. Had Israel intended to target civilians or acted with disregard for their presence, it stands to reason that the IDF could have used fewer munitions to inflict greater casualties, thereby conserving its resources.
"Taken together, this evidence strongly suggests that Israel exercised substantial precautions in its bombing campaign. In practice, the IDF often avoided bombing legitimate military objectives (such as tunnel shafts, sniper positions, and launch sites) until civilians had been evacuated, even at the expense of significant military advantage, as documented by the BBC in the Al-Zahra neighbourhood on October 19, 2023. All this suggests compliance with a strict interpretation of international law. We therefore believe the claim that the high volume of munitions reflects an intent to commit mass killing is unfounded.”
Use of unguided missiles
Israel has also received strong criticism for its use of unguided missiles. However, Israel is not unusual in using ‘dumb’ weapons. During the US invasion of Afghanistan, unguided munitions constituted 40% of total weapons used, and in Iraq, about 32%. During the Kosovo campaign, the rate was 70%. US and British air forces extensively used heavy unguided munitions during the siege of Mosul (2016-17) on a tiny area where 200,000 civilians were trapped by ISIS.
The report states: We therefore believe the claim that the high volume of munitions reflects an intent to commit mass killing is unfounded.
The report also points out that “Guided munitions that would cover the entirety of the quantities expended by Israel during the Gaza War were not available on the international market at any price.”
Mordechai claims that the IDF acted in an unusual or negligent manner in its assessment of incidental damage and the reliability of its intelligence. However, if IDF strikes are compared with the American strikes against Saddam regime officials in Iraq, in which none of the 55 Iraqi leaders on the US “blacklist” were killed in the initial strikes, Israel’s strikes have achieved better results, despite greater challenges, including targets hidden and shielded behind civilians and civil infrastructure.
Indiscriminate bombing?
Accusations of indiscriminate bombing have been cited. However, there is no evidence found that this has been done in order to kill civilians on a large scale. Four airstrikes in Rafah, and a strike in Nuseirat, in 2024 have been highlighted by Lee Mordechai, who contends that the targeted buildings contained no legitimate military objectives, and there was no justification. Whereas it is clear that there were tragic civilian deaths, the methodology of interviews with witnesses, and family members, are an unreliable method of determining the presence or absence of combatants, assessing civilian harm, or identifying legitimate military targets – therefore without knowing the military context, any judgement on these events cannot be made.
However, as the report makes clear, there is “the possibility that some attacks were based on faulty intelligence or were disproportionate, negligent, or even unjustified and illegal.” One such tragic incident occurred in Beit Lahiya on October 29, 2024, when 132 residents were killed by a bomb targeting a Hamas sniper: the strike was carried out based on the mistaken belief that the building had been evacuated, without the necessary precautions being taken. However, the report makes clear that “such catastrophic single strikes were relatively rare during the war, partly because of the precautions taken in many other cases.”
There is no evidence found that indiscriminate bombing has been done in order to kill civilians on a large scale.
Safer zones
It will be inevitably true that the frequent displacements directed at the Gazan civilian population will have caused significant hardship and challenges. However, as Part 2 in our series pointed out, despite the obvious challenges, evacuating citizens is by far the best way to significantly reduce casualty numbers.
Extensive efforts were put in place to move citizens away from active fighting zones. By January 2024, IDF reported having issued millions of calls and messages and more than seven million warning leaflets, warning citizens to evacuate either whole areas, or specific locations. These evacuations will not always have been effective, for some of them were confusing amid the fog of war, and warnings alone do not guarantee civilian safety; nonetheless, it is clear that the Israeli army went to significant efforts to evacuate people and reduce casualties.
However, it has been impossible for entirely safe areas to have been created – not least, as also pointed out previously, Hamas refused to designate anywhere a ‘safe zone’. For example, in December 2023, the Al-Mawasi area was designated by Israel as a humanitarian zone. This zone was later expanded to Deir al-Balah and the western neighbourhoods of Khan Younis. As the report notes, “Hamas exploited Israel’s unilateral declaration by using the zone as a safe haven for its leading officials, notably including Mohamad Deif, who was killed in an airstrike in the area. As of June 1, 2025, it continues to use the zone for its own protection. Likewise, Hamas relocated much of its surviving rocket launching capability into Al-Mawasi. Within days of its designation as a humanitarian zone, hundreds of rockets were fired from it into Israel, dozens of which fell within Gaza itself.”
Israel has been accused of targeting populations in the areas where civilians were told to go. However, the report states that statistically, those areas are much safer:
“Despite housing over half of Gaza’s population during the later stages of the conflict—and despite Hamas’s cynical use of the area for military purposes—the reported death toll within the designated humanitarian zone remained comparatively low. According to BBC Verify, around 550 deaths were recorded in the zone from May 2024 to January 2025, including 90 in the strike targeting Mohammed Deif, Hamas’s military commander. This figure accounts for just 2.1% of all identified deaths between May 2024 and March 2025. Using the GMO “reliable media report” supplemented data for April 30, 2024, this figure is 3.5% of all fatalities between May 2024 and March 2025.”
Those who evacuated to Israel’s unilaterally designated humanitarian zone had a much higher chance of survival than those who stayed in areas subject to evacuation orders.
It is also possible that some of these casualties resulted from errant Palestinian projectiles. Therefore, in reality, those who evacuated to Israel’s unilaterally designated humanitarian zone had a much higher chance of survival than those who stayed in areas subject to evacuation orders.
No indiscriminate bombing
In summary, therefore, it is clear that, whilst there have been tragic losses of civilian life through the bombing campaign, and that definite mistakes have been made, extensive efforts have been made by the IDF to limit civilian deaths, through evacuation orders, designation of ‘safer zones’, and, as much as possible, military choices made that avoid or reduce casualties.
Nonetheless, in the challenges of war, especially considering Hamas’ use of ‘human shields,’, there have still been many tragic deaths, as is inevitable considering the context of urban warfare. Therefore, it is apparent from reading the B-SCSS report that any claims of indiscriminate bombing are not backed up by the evidence available – once again, refuting the claims of genocide levelled against Israel.
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies report is written by the following scholars:
Prof. Danny Orbach is a military historian from the Department of History and Asian Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Dr. Jonathan Boxman is an independent scholar and an expert in quantitative analysis
Dr. Yagil Henkin is a military historian at Shalem College and the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security
Adv. Jonathan Braverman is a member of the Israeli bar and IHL lawyer